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THE ORIGINALITY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.
The striking and now famous remark of Mr. Gladstone-"As
the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has
ever proceeded from progressive history, so the American Con-
stitution is the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given
time by the brain and purpose of man,'"-has given good cause
for much discussion. Our most recent constitutional commenta-
tor has expressed himself on this point thus: "It was well said
by Gladstone that 'the American Constitution is the most won-
derful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and pur-
pose of man.' Sciolists and bookworms have sneered at the
phrase as overlooking the indebtedness of the Federal Conven-
tion to the teachings of history But the great statesman of our
own time well appreciated the value and the character of the
work of the statesmen of the eighteenth century. Their product
was new, if anything can be new, unless we destroy the word
and adopt the hyperbole of Solomon. The result was as much
an invention as were the first cotton-gin and telephone."' A
reviewer of the work of this commentator has also written with
special dogmatic energy, "As a whole the Constitution is just
what Gladstone called it-'the most wonderful work ever struck
off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.' "2 We
think, however, the prevailing view of Gladstone's remark
among our jurists and scholars has been to the effect that it was
quite wide of the mark, a hasty or superficial generalization,
which the fame of its author has alone floated into the accept-
Foster, Com. on Const. x, Sec. 6.
' Prof. Henry Pratt Judson in Am. Hist. Rev., April, 1896.
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ance of the uncritical or uninformed. The very emphatic opin-
ions of the two authorities now mentioned make it possibly
worth while to examine the point again.
Much depends in this case as in most cases on the meaning
attached to words. If an agreed or true meaning can be found
for the words used here by Mr. Gladstone, and if the same can
be done for the language used by Messrs. Foster and Judson, as
above -quoted, much will have been done towards fair argument
and correct conclusions.
Here, as is so often true, the language used is open to more
than one interpretation. What does Mr. Gladstone mean by
(i) "struck off"; (2) "at a given time"; (3) "by the brain
and purpose of man?" The whole remark is rhetorically an
antithesis; two contrasted ideas are set over against each other
-the growth or method of the British Constitution, and the
growth or method of the United States Constitution. The meas-
ure of one member of an antithesis may often be found in the
other. The idea of the British Constitution, intended by the
writer here, is an organism resulting from successive historical
facts and influences. The contrast to this is the idea of the
United States Constitution as a work done and completed at a
single point, or within a narrow limit of time. The antithesis
is clear-it is between a slow growth on the one hand and a
quick manufacture on the other. The one Constitution is repre-
sented as resulting from a long train of events and forces, the
other as created, "struck off," brought into being, at once., by the
effort of a few men working to that end.
Mr. Foster's idea, if his language is faithful to his idea, is, or
seems to be, that Mr. Gladstone had reference, in his description
of the Constitution of the United States, to the mere combining
of elements-principles, practices and methods-already known
and developed, and as in a mechanical invention like the cotton-
gin or the telephone, producing a general result properly called
new, or in the phrase of the law, "novel." Manifestly Mr.
Gladstone had no such notion in mind. His language will not
suffer such a meaning. He meant, not that the so-called authors
of our Constitution put together political principles and practices
already tried and known or familiar, but that they originated
political principles and practices or methods pot before known or
discovered. He meant this by his antithesis-the British Consti-
tution the product not of individual men acting consciously to
such end at a given time, but the product of impersonal forces
moving forward in the manner of history to an observed result.
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Under such a view his antithesis is as a mere piece of rhetoric
quite faultless; but if he meant to contrast the processes and
results of the impersonal forces of history with the processes and
products of mechanical combinations and contrivances, resulting
in what is known in patent law as "novelty," his antithesis loses
its point and propriety.
What Mr. Gladstone says may, therefore, be correctly stated
thus: The British Constitution is the slow result of historical
forces and influences; the Constitution of the United States is
the sudden result of the creative genius of our men of 1787.
Perhaps Professor Judson had such a contrast in mind, but man-
ifestly Mr. Foster had not. The latter's reference to the cotton-
gin and the telephone shows quite another thought. Mr. Glad-
stone's thought is, not that those who drew the Constitution of
1789, were ridacteurs, but creators, discoverers, originators,
whereas the British Constitution was not only unwritten, but, as
it were, uncreated and unoriginated, save as a result of influ-
ences which no one man, or assembly or generation of men, had
controlled or guided.
This statement or vindication of Mr. Gladstone's rhetorical
attitude and real meaning has been necessary in order that we
may see whether his view be accurate or superficial, illuminating
or misleading. What we maintain, in opposition to Mr. Glad-
stone's notion, is that the Constitution of the United-States is as
truly the result of progressive history, as truly an organism
proceeding from antecedent historical ideas and principles, as is
the British Constitution; that the work of the authors of the
Constitution of 1789, was not, by contrast, creative and original,
but very strictly of a selecting, arranging, and combining
nature-a really synthetical, and not an originating, work.
And we may say here, as well as later, that the work of the
men of 1787 called for and showed wisdom, sagacity and pres-
cience of an order as high as if 'they had set themselves to con-
trive and create new methods and principles of government. In
truth, it showed far greater wisdom. On another occasion the
present writer thus expressed his view of this point:
"The wisdom of the authors of the Constitution of 1789 lay, be it ever
remembered, in following no fascinating theories of natural right and justice,
nor brilliant philosophical speculations upon the nature of society and govern-
ment, but in a profound knowledge and application of the familiar, home-
bred. hard-won, slowly maturing results of the political life and experience of
the American people as colonies and as States under the Confederation. The
authors of our political and judicial systems wrought with materials furnished
by that long, symmetrical. Providential training which, through a century and
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a half of feeble and futile confederation had schooled them for their sublime
task of'preserving and perpetuating their local governments through familiar
local agencies, and yet binding them all, by indivisible bonds, into one har-
monious Plural Unit. Honored be their memories! Their abounding and
unselfish patriotism; their grave and serene trust in their cause; their lofty
and invincible faith in human nature; their brave and unshaken confidence in
our capacity for self-government; but more than all, except their antique and
severe public virtues, their simple reliance on what history and experience
had taught them!" 3
What, now, are the evidences which go to determine the issue
we have above stated? Generally, they are the facts which sup-
port the general conclusion that all the methods and principles,
with but one important exception, which were combined and
wrought together into the Constitution of 1789, were well known
and, we may fairly say, familiar, in theory and practice before
1787. The exception is the method provided in our Constitution
for the election of President and Vice-President. It is even
stated on good authority that "that was borrowed from the Con-
stitution of Maryland, which provided a similar method for the
election of its Senators. "'4 And it is a most significant and
impressive fact that this exception is really the only feature of
our Constitution which has become essentially a dead letter, the
central idea of this provision having long ago been superseded
in practice by a method directly opposite in its effects to the
intended effects of the provision of the Constitution. The
scheme of the Constitution, in this respect only, may have been
an invention "as much as were the cotton-gin and the tele-
phone," but for want of any roots in the past, as well as for
want of harmony with democratic tendencies, it fell and passed
into innocuous desuetude, while the other chief features of the
Constitution, having "proceeded from progressive history," have
lived and grown strong and stronger.
Perhaps before going farther it may be well to ask what is
meant by the idea which is expressed by the phrase, "proceeded
from progressive history." It is rather a misty and grandiose
phrase, and in that respect quite characteristic of its author-
resounding rather than accurate, rhetorical rather than carefully
descriptive. Reduced to common speech, it seems to be in-
tended and understood to exclude to some great degree and in
some strict sense the idea of conscious aimor plan or agency of
individual men or generations of individual men. It appears to
a Const. Hist. as seen in Am. Law, 283 (Putnams, 1889).
4 Henry Wade Rogers, LL.D., in Const. Hist. as seen in Am. Law 9, cit-
ing 2 Pitkin's -Political and Civil History of the United States," 302.
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be used to connote an order or evolution of results which is
directed by higher powers than man's. We do ndt quarrel here
with this abstract notion, but it does not appear how it can be
truly applied to the British Constitution in any special sense. It
would at times seem that those who use Gladstone's phrases, if
not their author himself, conceive of history as some great irre-
sistible force or current, like a pre-historic glacier, carrying in
its mass huge boulders which it deposits here and there, which
remain as landmarks and guides to succeeding generations of men.
Some such vague conception seems to be in the minds of many
-when the discourse is of the British Constitution. It is far from
the fact. The British Constitution has been the work of indi-
vidual men, of separate human hands, of distinct generations of
-men-statesmen, rulers, philosophers, jurists-all real men
whose personalities and names are known and registered. In no
other sense is it an historical deposit like a glacial rock or collec-
tion of rocks, than that many of the men who wrought it out
and fashioned it lived in far-back tracts of history and were rep-
resentatives of long successive periods of time. The British
Constitution is not written in one document; its text is nowhere
accessible as a whole; its muniments and titles and documents,
most of them, cannot be inspected in their original forms like
enrolled Constitutions or legislative acts of the day, but this is
the most superficial of differences. Progressive history, if it
means more than the successive efforts and results of human
agents largely self-directed to self-determined ends is a mis-
leading and deceptive phrase, even when applied to the British
Constitution.
Our thesis now is-that the separate features of the Constitu-
tion of the United States were well-known before 1787, and were
in truth products of history, "proceeded," if one pleases so to
call it, from "progressive history." The proper limits of this
article will not permit much detail in confirmation of this view,
but a little may well be said to that point.
Our federal Union is a union of individual States, each State
a civil organism complete within itself, once sovereign and inde-
pendent, and still an organism distinct from the Union or
nation. The States existed before the Union and might and
doubtless would exist as States after the Union should have
passed away." From the States came the Union under the Con-
stitution. The original, historic unit was the State-Massachu-
5 Chief-Justice Chase in Lane Co. v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 76, 78, and in Texas
v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725.
YALE LA W JOURNAL.
setts, Virginia, Connecticut, for example. Any adequate study
of the origin of our Union and nation must begin with the States.
The American State, Connecticut for instance, is as free and
true a growth of history as England herself. She certainly was
not "struck off, at a given time, by the brain or purpose of man."
She was born and gre w, and was not hand-made, or man-made,
in any other sense than England was.
Out of States, thus organically produced, came the Union.
The tendency and thought which pushed on all the efforts at a
union of the colonies from 1735 to 1776, and finally resulted in
the Union of 1789, was the same historical force which had, mov-
ing more slowly, made England, by successive steps out of the
village-community, the hundred, and the shire. The attempts
at Union in this country were not satisfactory till by a course of
training and education-as truly historical, or "proceeding from
progressive history," as any force that can be named-the peo-
ple of the States, recognizing the necessity of a more perfect
Union, rose to the great conception and work of our federal
Union. Thus, the Union of 1789 is a strictly historical result.
The manner and form of the Union are not less so. The men
who sat in convention in 1787 did not contrive the union, nor
did they contrive its form. These grew out of antecedent expe-
riences of the people and took form from the same influences.
The seed-thought of this Union is a power which can act and be
empowered to act on the individual citizens, instead of the
States as political corporations. Did Hamilton, or Madison con-
trive this idea or this Union? No more than Henry VIII. or
Elizabeth contrived the consolidation of England. One may
search the records of the Convention of 1787, nowhere to find
any direct discussion of this idea. The idea was there before the
Convention met. It demanded, through the people, simple rec-
ognition. It received recognition, and thus the Union became a
fact.
The people, on the other hand, enured to local or self-govern-
ment, by their constant experience as colonists, had come to
associate their freedom with their local governments. Here
again was the germ of the remarkable feature-the hiding-place
of the strength of our system-which gave to the Union only
such powers as were needed for certain clearly-defined ends, and
retained all else for the original States or the people. Who of
the men of 1787 contrived or "struck off" this idea? No man;
because the idea was already born, already warm and fixed in
the hearts and convictions of the people.
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The great general features of the three departments of the
government-legislative, executive and judicial-and the divis-
ion of the legislative into two chambers, were in no sense new
or untried or unfamiliar; they were the well-known features
of most of the State governments. The national judiciary,
especially the Supreme Court, is often remarked as pecu-
liar, and Sir Henry Maine has called it, by overstatement, "a
virtually unique creation of the founders of the Constitution,' '"
but even this was only the application to the National govern-
ment of a feature or method already familiar to the States be-
fore 1787. In 1787 eleven of the thirteen States had written
constitutions, and courts were empowered to pass upon questions
of the conformity of legislative enactments or executive acts, to
the fundamental constitutions. Says an able writer recently:
"Before the Federal Constitution was framed the constitutions
of the several States had established supreme courts within
their States, and those courts exercised the power of declaring
legislative acts void, when in conflict with their respective con-
stitutions, before ever the Supreme Court of the United States
asserted a similar power in 1803, in the great case of Marbury v.
Madison," ' and this writer gives abundant historic evidences of
the fact thus stated.8 This practice or principle was not known
at that time in Europe, nor is it now. "In short," says the last-
quoted authority, "there is not in Europe to this day a Court
with authority to pass on the constitutionality of national laws."
But in this country, as has been said, the idea and practice were
well established in 1787.
The general constitution of the two houses of Congress was
plainly after the models of the House of Lords and House of
Commons in England, with only such changes as were already
familiar in most of the States. The special basis of representa-
tion in the lower House-population-was in accordance with
State practice, while equal representation in the Senate was but
a concession to the smaller States, due to the exigencies of the
occasion and in no sense a work of constructive ingenuity or
wisdom. The great provision requiring all revenue bills to orig-
inate in the lower House is merely a copy of the hard-won right
of the Commons of England.
It has been observed by many eminent writers on this sub-
6Pop. Gov't, p. 217.
Cranch. 137.
Henry Wade Rogers, LL.D., in Const. Hist. as seen in Am. Law, 9, io.
9 .1d., n1.
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ject, that the United States Constitution is marked, as was no
other Constitution before it, by a system and series of limitations
of all the powers conferred by it. It is true. Our Constitution
is unique in this respect among all national constitutions of the
past or present, but is this feature an invention or creation of
the men of 1787? Plainly not; the idea was already found in the
State constitutions. The idea, too, was deeply wrought into the
thought and purpose of the people of 1787, by their recent expe-
rience. The unlimited powers of Parliament and King in Eng-
land had forced them into rebellion, and when their representa-
tives sat down in the conventionjof 1787 to put into express form
a constitution of government, no mandate of the people, no
thought of the hour, was more imperative and controlling than
that of excluding from every nook and corner of the constitution
the idea or possibility of absolute power. Hence, the great
series of limitations which creates so large a field of our constitu-
tional law-constitutional limitations-is not an invention or
thought of any member of the convention of 1787, but is in a
special and eminent sense the result of history, of historical facts
and influences which moved men in that convention, as it also
then moved the whole people of the United States.
In this way we might go over each item of the Constitution,
and the result would be in substance the same. The strength,
the vitality, the permanence, the wisdom, and the glory of our
chart of national government, lie in the fact that, not unlike the
British Constitution, but strictly like it, it is in truth the expres-
sion of rules, methods, and principles developed by history,
made familiar by long experience, and therefore suited to the
wants and ways of the people. In our Constitution, as truly as
in any human document or memorial, we see the results of his-
tory and the control of experience. It cannot be correctly
described as "a work struck off at a given time by the brain and
purpose of man," nor can it be contrasted with the British Con-
stitution as being less the product of historical forces and influ-
ences.
